Autonomy and Chronic Illness: Not Two Components But Many by Scanlan, Camilla Louise & Kerridge, I
Autonomy and chronic illness: not two components but many. 
Camilla Scanlan and Ian H Kerridge  
 
Naik et al argue that ‘decisional autonomy’ is insufficient to account for non-
adherence in the context of chronic illness and that what is required is a two-
compartment re-conceptualisation of autonomy that includes both decisional 
autonomy and ‘executive autonomy’. While the authors correctly point out the 
concentration on the cognitive aspects of competence in the bioethics and medical 
literature, the model of autonomy that they propose is consistent with process or 
discursive models of consent, and with the work of Bergsma and Thomasma,1 
Gillon,2  Beauchamp and Childress,3 all of whom describe the importance of action 
or enactment in medical decision-making. Indeed, while autonomy is usually defined 
in terms of self government, it can usefully be described as being a cluster of notions 
that together signify control of decision-making. Included in this cluster according to 
Bergsma and Thomasma1  is the ability to set life-plans, and the capacity to adapt to 
changing circumstances. To successfully carry out a decision three functions come 
into play (i) autonomy of thought (ii) autonomy of will and (iii) autonomy of action. It 
follows then that the patients in the study described by Naik et al have autonomy of 
thought (occurrent aspect), and of will (intentionality), evidenced by their 
participation in developing self management plans, but according to Gillon,2 are 
deficient in autonomy of action (disposition aspect). This agrees with Beauchamp 
and Childress’ principles3 underpinning autonomy as being liberty (independence 
from controlling influences) and agency (capacity for intentional action).  
The primacy of autonomy in medical care has been extensively critiqued over the 
past two decades. Naik et al provide yet another reason to be sceptical of simplistic 
formulations of autonomy and decision-making in medicine. At the same time, 
however, we believe that the authors continue to over-emphasise rationality, de-
emphasise the social and relational basis of autonomy and agency, and provide an 
insufficiently complete model of capacity in chronic illness. As much can be seen by 
their description of ‘biopsychosocial correlates of autonomy’ which draws upon 
recent developments in neurobiology but says nothing about the social or relational 
basis of illness.  
We report the results of on-going qualitative research with patients undergoing 
allogeneic haematopoietic stem cell transplant (‘bone marrow transplant’) for a range 
of haematological malignancies that suggest that the reasons for non-adherence 
may be much more complex than that provided by Naik and colleagues. The 
participants in our study were aged from mid twenties to sixty and none had any 
history of concomitant psychiatric disorders, or of diminished decisional capacity. All 
had received extensive education regarding transplantation.  In each case, 
allogeneic stem cell transplant (allo-SCT) provided the only, or the greatest chance 
of long-term survival. One might assume, therefore, that these people would be 
highly motivated to adhere with the established management plan. In fact, a number 
of the participants in this study chose to ‘go against’ the established treatment 
regime; some chose not to take antibiotics, others refused to remain in isolation at 
the time when they were at high risk of infection due to lowered immunity, some 
continued to smoke during the transplant period when they were at high risk of 
serious respiratory infections, others took up their pre-transplant social and 
occupational ‘roles’ when this may have posed an infection risk, with one man 
carrying out physically demanding work including deconstructing an old shed and 
several cars soon after discharge from hospital and against medical advice. Given 
that none had educational or cognitive barriers to executing their management plan, 
were their actions really a deficit in executive autonomy, or perhaps related to 
something else?    
One of the problems with autonomy is that it fails to account for the moral 
significance of vulnerability in the setting of serious illness and dependency on 
healthcare and assumes that decisions are, and even should be rational. For in the 
context of chronic illness a person may do; 
• the ‘right thing’ for the ‘right  reason’  
• the or ‘right thing’ for the ‘wrong  reason’  
• the ‘wrong thing’ for the ‘right reason’ 
• or the ‘wrong thing’ for the ‘wrong reason’,  
and still be acting autonomously. 
Patients choosing not to adhere with the agreed management plan were acting 
against their ‘medical best interests’ but were arguably acting in a way that restored 
control over their lives, and their illness.4 We would argue that if a patient elects to 
“take control” the only way he/she knows, or the only way that he/she can, by 
choosing to “do things their way”, as some patients in our study reported, then they 
may be acting autonomously, with capacity, and with rationality, insofar as their 
actions are consistent with their belief system and with the choices open to them.  
In other words, assessments of an individual’s capacity to plan, sequence and carry 
out tasks only makes sense within the context of their life’s narrative and their illness 
experience and may be better understood through a broad construction of agency 
than through executive autonomy.  
This is not, however, inconsistent with theories of autonomy, as there is frequently 
overlap between agency and autonomy, and autonomy may include reference to; (i) 
sovereignty over him/herself (ii) ‘capacity’ to reflect on and identify his/her desires or 
preferences (iii) ‘agency’ i.e. is capable of rationally guiding one’s reasoned desires 
into actions and (iv) free will.  
Benson5 defined the autonomous person as one who is able to  
…trust ones’ own powers and to have a disposition to use them, to be able to 
resist the fear of failure, ridicule or disapproval that threatens to drive one into 
reliance on the guidance of others.  
While this seems clear, this idea is challenged by the context of serious illness, as 
patients have little choice but to rely upon medical expertise for their survival.  
Dworkin6 and Frankfurt7 amongst others, believe that autonomy is a matter of the 
patient having capacity to reflectively control and identify with one’s basic (first order) 
desires through higher-level (second order) desires. This may be logical but it also 
assumes that anxiety, fear, or the desire to avoid death, all diminish functional 
autonomy – a rather narrow reading of the existential impact of serious illness.   
Agency can be constructed purely in terms of rational choice.8  People may act in 
certain ways because it is the only thing that they can do, and patients may, for 
example, choose to undergo transplant not because their choice is a logical 
considered assessment of the burdens and benefits of treatment, but because, in 
the face of death, they believe they have no option. Likewise, non-adherence may, 
to others, seem completely irrational, but when one cannot do anything else to 
regain a sense of control over one’s life, then it becomes completely explicable. In 
this way, actions that seem entirely out of step with an agreed management plan 
may be entirely consistent with free will, according to Frankfurt’s construction of free 
will as the harmony between desires and volition of one’s values,7 or the subject of 
control by unconscious fear or desires.   
Thus, while a patient’s non-adherence with management plans may be frustrating for 
their healthcare team (and sometimes for the patient’s family) we need to make a 
serious attempt to understand their situation and their perspective given that the 
choices that a person makes are only comprehensible within their individual, social, 
cultural and institutional context. Any useful conception of autonomy must therefore 
acknowledge the impact of illness on choice and behaviour and the influences, 
constraints and obligation that arise from the network of social relationships that 
envelope us.  
Should we, as Naik et al, suggest, develop a means for testing the executive 
autonomy, resolve or intentionality of every patient prior to their commencing 
treatment for a chronic or serious illness? And what would we do if we identified a 
patient who appeared to have ‘weakness of will’ or who appeared more likely to 
have difficulty with adherence?  
We would suggest that rather than developing more complex neurobiological or 
neuropsychiatric assessments, what is required is closer attention to a patient’s 
narrative and to the way in which acute or chronic illness may disrupt this narrative. 
This may both enable members of the healthcare team to understand why patients 
may act in the ways that they do and also assist them to construct a management 
plan more consistent with the patient’s particular goals, needs and capabilities. At 
times this may mean that health professionals will have to accept that non-
adherence is a meaningful expression of a patient’s autonomy, and at times they 
may need to encourage patients to accept care and guidance from others.5 We 
would also suggest that while Naik et al are right to broaden the scope of thinking 
about autonomy, what is ultimately required is acknowledgement of the impact of 
illness on independence and social relationships and the importance of trust, the 
provision of care and compassion.9,10
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